II. OUTLINE OF CCS, SIMILARITIES TO AND DIFFERENCES FROM ESTABLISHED SUBSURFACE INDUSTRIES

A. Hydrocarbon Exploration and Production
Investigation and exploitation of legal subsoil -here focusing on deep geology -has been occurring for many decades. The most extensive industries are: oil and gas (hydrocarbon) exploration and production; groundwater production and use; coal and mineral mining; and the more recent engineering to extract geothermal heat. Of these, the hydrocarbon industries have a uniquely comprehensive suite of experience and high-technology expertise in the visualisation, investigation and modelling that allows exploitation of deep sedimentary basins. 3 Exploitation typically occurs to depths of 4 km, and less frequently to depths of 8 km, in both onshore and offshore settings. Liquid oil or gas is extracted from the deep subsurface by means of boreholes, resulting in reduced subsurface pressures. In many cases this extraction is augmented and increased by the injection of additional water from the surface or surrounding sea. In about 180 cases worldwide, there has been, and is, experience of injecting natural CO 2 to enhance oil recovery, as this can repressurise the deep hydrocarbon reservoir, driving the oil upwards, and CO 2 can also chemically dissolve into the oil, forming a less viscous fl uid that fl ows more easily to the surface. The volumes of fl uid handled by the hydrocarbon industry on a daily basis are indeed massive: for the US alone, the fi gures are 16 million barrels/day (2.54 Mm 3 ) hydrocarbon-produced fl uids and 38 million barrels/day water injection. Carbon dioxide injection for full-scale CCS would be similar in scale. It is clear that substantial expertise exists in the hydrocarbon industry to enable the understanding of 3D geometry of porous rock bodies in the deep subsurface, the understanding of the impermeable seal that seals such a reservoir, and the mechanical and fl uid engineering necessary to circulate such large amounts of fl uid on a routine daily basis. However, the CCS proposition 4 contains substantial differences from these established hydrocarbon industries. First is the philosophical difference of polarity, in that oil and gas are produced, whereas CO 2 will be injected for disposal. Secondly, the production of oil and gas leaves a lesser fl uid volume in the deep subsurface (there is no empty space in the subsurface), whereas the injection of CO 2 will place a greater volume of fl uid into the subsurface. Thirdly, the production of hydrocarbon is a high-value product, produced during a timescale of years to decades, where production can be halted or increased at will with only commercial penalties. By contrast, CO 2 storage requires projection and accurate prediction not just during the 30-year life span of a CO 2 storage operation, but also into the geological longer term to provide assurance of 10,000 years of retention. Fourthly, the ineffective production of hydrocarbon simply carries a penalty of lost potential income, whereas failure of CO 2 storage carries a penalty or a fi ne outweighing the value of the price paid for CO 2 , and additionally carries a hard-to-quantify-and-limit risk of damage to climate or to local life around a leakage point in the future.
B. Geothermal Exploration and Production
Although extraction of heat from the shallow earth crust is nowhere near the industrial scale, or the commercial value, of the hydrocarbon industry, there are similarities in geological circumstance. Low temperature geothermal production and CO 2 storage both require the use of porous and permeable bodies of reservoir rock, of regional extent (ie tens of kilometres). Geothermal borehole development has extensive experience in injecting circulation waters to acquire the associated heat. In many cases, this is a demonstrably successful system. However, in some well-known instances (Soultz, Basel), a series of small earth tremors (magnitude 2.0 -3.5 on the Richter scale) have been created, leading to public disquiet and the halting of a project. These provide important indications that the stress fi eld in sedimentary rocks of the 1 -3 km subsurface is in close balance and can easily be perturbed by small increases of fl uid pressure. Earth tremors can be expected during CO 2 injection.
C. Shale Gas Production
Since the mid-1990s, it has become apparent in the US that large volumes of methane gas can be extracted from mudrocks in the intermediate depth subsurface, which were previously regarded as having zero resource potential. The mechanism of production is to drill boreholes spaced at 1 -3 km intervals, and to enhance the fl ow of gas from the mudrock by means of creating new fracture networks. This is done by injection of pressurised water, deliberately creating small earth tremors as a consequence of the new fracture networks. In these cases, public disquiet appears to be Geological Factors for Legislation to Enable, etc Storage 9 much less of an issue, even though the subsurface operation is of a very similar type and a very similar effect to that of geothermal heat mining. The difference may be that many of these shale explorations have been in sparsely populated areas of the US, and also that the above-ground population is much more accustomed to, and content with, the consequences of subsurface drilling and exploitation.
D. Carbon Dioxide Storage
Several settings are envisaged for storage of CO 2 in the deep subsurface. These are likely to incur different effects around the immediate injection site, and these effects are discussed at greater length in section III. Compared to the established industries described here, CO 2 storage requires much better predictions into the future than the oil industry has been accustomed to making. The predictions must also include a better understanding of the three-dimensional geometry of connected rock bodies below ground, which is a question never previously considered in detail. For enhanced oil recovery, challenges and technologies are similar to those already known, so that the regulation and legal diffi culties may be much better defi ned. For injection and storage into passive depleted methane gas-fi elds or oilfi elds, the CO 2 injection is likely to be well constrained, with a detailed suite of information derived during production of the hydrocarbons and a good understanding of the local rock-body geometry, its connections and its yield points. Carbon dioxide injection into saline formations is signifi cantly more challenging. If individual structures can be identifi ed, similar to hydrocarbon trapping structures, these may be the easiest to map their limits, monitor and demonstrate CO 2 retention. If, however, CO 2 is injected into the much larger storage spaces available in dipping saline formations without discrete structural traps, then the monitoring, demonstration of CO 2 location and retention will be potentially much more diffi cult, with a clear choice to trade off adequate precision against excessive expense. In all saline formation settings, the long-term prediction of CO 2 migration, combined with pressure increases, will require detailed and site-specifi c assessment.
III. CONCEPTS OF SUBSURFACE ZONING
Injection of CO 2 into the deep subsurface may produce several geological effects. These can be considered as (i) direct physical effects and (ii) indirect communication effects. It is useful to consider the subsurface as a series of three zones, each of which possesses certain attributes to contain injected CO 2 (see Figure 1 .1). First, the basic requirement is a primary reservoir, combined with a primary seal, together with a side seal and under seal. The primary seal may not directly overlie the reservoir, resulting in a ' waste zone ' above the primary reservoir, which may become occupied by CO 2 . Secondly, above the primary seal is a thick sequence, normally of sedimentary rocks, which comprises the overburden. This may contain secondary and tertiary reservoirs, with secondary and tertiary seals. However, this may also contain steeply dipping, or vertical, pathways of preferential gas or fl uid leakage from the present day, or in the recent geological past. These can act as opportune leakage routes for rapid CO 2 migration, and require careful baseline evaluation, followed by monitoring. Thirdly, above the overburden lies the ' surface environment ' where groundwater may be extracted or exploited, and the shallow subsurface may contain living organisms even before the seabed is reached. Fourthly, above the shallow subsurface is the marine water column, or soil and atmosphere, where CO 2 may become diluted and dispersed. In terms of planning for resource use, these different subsurface zones may well have, or be planned to have, different uses. For example, the shallow zones may require to be preserved for groundwater extraction, such that any input of more saline water would be highly undesirable. At deeper levels the use of secondary or tertiary saline formations may be planned for geothermal heat extraction, or for water extraction, or even for methane gas or hydrogen storage. An additional factor may be interference with hydrocarbon production beneath a CO 2 storage reservoir, or more directly threatening effects if the same reservoir is shared both as a CO 2 storage site and 20 km laterally as a hydrocarbon production zone, which may often be operated by a different commercial entity under a different hydrocarbon licensing Enable, etc Storage 11 regime. In the nascent CO 2 licensing regimes of the UK, EU, US and Canada, it seems that hydrocarbon production has ' priority ' . What that means in practice remains to be negotiated case by case, because over-prioritisation of hydrocarbons would sterilise most regions identifi ed as CO 2 storage resources.
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IV. CONCEPTS OF INJECTION AND STORAGE
These different zones (see Figure 1 .1) also have a conceptual use, in that together they can be considered as an injection zone and its adjacent surroundings (the storage Site), where CO 2 is then placed into the reservoir. There is a zone of routine lowlevel monitoring in the waste zone and primary seal above the reservoir. Above the monitoring zone can be considered a potential zone of remediation, where reservoir engineering interventions can be made to secure leaks and enhanced monitoring can be deployed if leaks are detected. Above the remediation zone is the majority of the storage complex, which extends up to the base of the shallow subsurface. The introduction of the storage complex concept is very helpful to physically and legally contain secondary migration of CO 2 in the subsurface.
Defi ning subsurface zones in three-dimensional space enables monitoring to be focused onto the boundaries, for determination of the success of CO 2 retention. However, there needs to be clarity on what is intended. Is the intention to inject captured greenhouse gas and prevent stored CO 2 from reaching the shallow depth biosphere, land surface and atmosphere to drive global warming ? Or is the intention to make a detailed assessment of all subsurface effects of that injection, which could include changes of deep water chemistry in the storage reservoir site, the displacement of ambient pre-injection water (or other fl uids), the detection of fl uid pressure pulses and the attribution of induced seismicity. Clearly the fi rst is more aligned with the objective of CO 2 storage; and although the second approach may feel more comforting to a regulator, it is immensely onerous for a storage operator, for little practical benefi t.
In principle, the lateral extent of a ' storage complex ' could be many tens of kilometres; however, it is probable that for practical purposes the licensing authority will wish to restrict the area to a few kilometres diameter. Migration of small amounts of CO 2 from the primary reservoir and along bounding faults is not necessarily a problem under this conceptualisation. Although such migration would be unplanned and unexpected, it will trigger enhanced and detailed monitoring once detected by the low-level background monitoring. Carbon dioxide could migrate through the overburden, to be dispersed or retained by a secondary, or even a tertiary, seal.
The concept of permanent storage is elusive in geological timescales. Depending on the context, it could mean hundreds or thousands of years from a human societal perception; or it could mean tens of millions of years in the context of a sedimentary basin receiving stored CO 2 ; or it could mean many hundreds of millions of years during the lifetime of the Earth. For the purpose of climate mitigation, a pragmatic timescale for storage is linked to the duration needed for the Earth ' s climate system to dispose of excess (post-industrial) CO 2 . That can be taken as a minimum 1,000 -10,000 years, so that any leakage in that timescale can be viewed as ' failure ' . Natural CO 2 accumulations clearly demonstrate that it is possible to retain high concentrations of pure CO 2 in single subsurface locations for timescales of tens of thousands, or even tens of millions, of years. However, technical factors in extrapolating results of reservoir engineering models mean that small uncertainties in the measurement of a storage site at the present day, propagate into larger uncertainties further into the future. Consequently, it is very diffi cult to make precise predictions even for timescales of thousands or tens of thousands of years. Predictions for timescales of millions of years into the future are often made using techniques to statistically combine an assemblage of risks assessed at the present day, and multiply by what is envisaged as a full suite of possible future circumstances. In such situations, it is extremely diffi cult to state that there will be zero leakage in all cases, even though the overwhelming majority of simple future scenarios demonstrate zero, or minimal, leakage. There is a clear danger that over-regulation may attempt to provide ' guarantees ' of secure storage into the far future. A more pragmatic approach will take a nuanced and risk-based approach, on the understanding that the natural world is neither black nor white but composed of many shades of grey. The state may ultimately take over liability for stored CO 2 , but in doing so is entitled to ask the storage operator for predictability.
A wrong conception has arisen resulting from a misreading of section 1.6.3 of the Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on CCS. 5 This states that a leakage rate of 0.001 (0.1 per cent) or more in 5,000 years has to be unacceptable. This has frequently been misinterpreted to imply that a leakage rate of 0.1 per cent is expected . That is untrue. A combination of good site choice together with a competent subsurface operator should mean that leakage rates will be much less than 0.1 per cent in 5,000 years. It is also incorrect to assume that all storage sites will leak in a similar manner at a similar rate. Information from natural oil accumulations and methane gas-fi elds clearly shows that such assumptions are unjustifi ed, and retention at sites that are performing well is much better than this, for millions of years. Evidence from over 30 years of engineering experience with methane gas storage in porous subsurface reservoirs also demonstrates that signifi cant leakage is improbable. Each subsurface storage site will be individual, and will need individual assessment and individual treatment, even though common approaches, rules and processes are expected to be available. 6 
V. GUIDANCE ON STORAGE SITES AND MONITORING ZONES
Here the concept of a subsurface ' storage complex ' is examined (see Figure 1 .1). This involves a much larger volume, to be defi ned by the licence applicant, and could
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7 Metz et al, n 5 above.
extend from beneath the reservoir for several kilometres vertically up to the shallow subsurface, without reaching the shallow subsurface.
A. Accommodating Imperfect Sites
Expecting, and legislating for, total security of storage is unreasonable, although desirable. There are several ways around this problem. A realistic approach may be to legislate for the possibility of small-scale unintended leakage. Several modelling studies show that the small ' tongue ' at the leading edge of a CO 2 plume immediately beneath the primary seal is extremely diffi cult to contain within a Site (eg Figure 1 .1, extreme ends of CO 2 plume). If 1 per cent of CO 2 is predicted to leak from a Site into the complex within 1,000 years by this well-understood process, and does not leave the storage complex into the biosphere or atmosphere, is that a terminal problem ? This could simply result in the site operator ' s paying a penalty to reimburse the regulator for the expense of monitoring leakage outside the primary reservoir. Alternatively, an operator may choose to under-fi ll a site, to avoid the possibility of leakage -that could become a problem for governments if pre-owned storage resources are handed back; can a second operator be licensed, and who would be responsible if any CO 2 were to leak at a later date ? It is again important to realise that a correctly undertaken site evaluation and site-choosing process is essential before any CO 2 injection occurs. If this has been undertaken correctly, the risk of unplanned leakage is minimal, and it would be entirely unreasonable to expect and legislate for insurance of all of the injected CO 2 to be released.
B. How much CO 2 can Leak ? i. Natural Processes of Trapping
It is impossible for all injected CO 2 to leak from the storage site reservoir, and very improbable that any signifi cant quantity of CO 2 will leave the storage complex to reach the biosphere or surface. The only CO 2 mobile for catastrophic leakage in the short term (days to years) is the dense phase (fl uid and gas) CO 2 in the wellbore and pipeline. As explained in the 2005 IPCC Special Report on CCS, 7 there are several processes operating that act to retain CO 2 in porous rock in the deep subsurface. During injection, the risk of unplanned leakage increases progressively, as pressure within the reservoir increases and could reactivate boundary faults orvery rarely -break the top seal. The quantity of free phase CO 2 also increases. This is also the time at which maximum industrial intervention is occurring, with greatest on-site capability for continual monitoring, intervention and remediation. During injection, and continuing rapidly (weeks, years) after injection ceases, fl uid CO 2 is dissolving in residual pore water, CO 2 movement leaves behind isolated bubbles of 14 Stuart Haszeldine and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh 8 NM Burnside and M Naylor , ' Review and implications of relative permeability of CO 2 /brine systems and residual trapping of CO 2 ' ( 2014 ) 23 International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 1 .
9 S Serno et al, ' Using oxygen isotopes to quantitatively assess residual CO 2 saturation during the CO 2 CRC Otway Stage 2B Extension residual saturation test ' ( 2016 ) 52 International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 73 .
10 SMV Gilfi llan et al, ' Using noble gas fi ngerprints at the Kerr Farm to assess CO 2 leakage allegations linked to the Weyburn-Midale CO 2 monitoring and storage project ' ( 2017 ) 63 International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Contro l 215 . fl uid CO 2 (residual saturation trapping) and reactions occur, which are usually geologically slow (multiple millennia), to form new minerals by consuming the CO 2 as a reactant. All these processes reduce the quantity of mobile CO 2 . Residual saturation and dissolution are most important in retaining CO 2 in sandstone reservoirs, and between 20 and 80 per cent of CO 2 can be immobilised by this process. 8 That means a mode of only 60 per cent CO 2 can physically leak, and that leakage will move into overlying aquifers, where additional residual saturation trapping can occur, leaving very little CO 2 capable of reaching the land surface.
The point of maximum risk of catastrophic leakage, then, is in the closing stages of injection. After that point, the processes of CO 2 dissolution into pore water, physical dissipation of excess pressure and migration-assisted trapping irrevocably decrease the risk of CO 2 leakage. Individual simulation and calculation will be needed for each storage site, but the quantity of CO 2 able to leak as discrete fl uid or gaseous CO 2 quickly reduces to just a very few tens of per cent.
ii. Tracking and Fingerprinting CO 2
The quantity of dissolved CO 2 will be useful to determine, for actuarial purposes of calculating the possible leakage. This can be achieved remotely by seismic refl ection survey geophysics, as CO 2 brine has a sonic velocity different from that of brine with fl uid CO 2 bubbles, and from brine with no CO 2 . Calibration and verifi cation can be achieved by resampling the reservoir brine plus CO 2 , and using oxygen and carbon stable isotopes to geochemically determine the amount of pore water-to-CO 2 interaction. 9 To identify and fi ngerprint CO 2 that has migrated as a gas phase, or which has dissolved into pore water and migrated, it is possible to use the tiny mixture of noble gases dissolved into the CO 2 as a fi ngerprint. Sophisticated understanding of the abundances and ratios of different noble gas isotopes can produce quantitative insights to the sources of CO 2 , the quantity of subsurface water contacted and the differences from CO 2 derived from other capture owners. Noble gases and stable isotope signatures of CO 2 have been trialled in a quasi-litigation setting at Weyburn, to successfully rebut accusations of CO 2 leakage. 10
C. Pressure Processes and Extent Around the Injection Site
Excess pressure will extend for many kilometres beyond the physical CO 2 plume, and excess pressure will usually be a limiting physical condition on injection rates, close to the boreholes. Because of the density difference between CO 2 and brine in the reservoir, the vertical column thickness of CO 2 produces a pressure disequilibrium at the base of the top seal, which augments the excess pressure due to the increased volume of fl uid during injection. This can cause new fractures in the overlying cap rock. Or, more likely, a reactivation of slippage along faults within the rock volume of this transient pressure bubble. Modelling of the subsurface shows that measurable pressure increases are expected at 30 -50kms distance from the injection sites. 11 These are likely to cause small-scale seismicity, barely detectable at the land surface, and with minimal or no damage to the built environment. The pressure pulse decays away during a few decades, by slow movement of water or CO 2 pore fl uid into the waste zone above the reservoir and beneath the seal, laterally away from the injection site, and also down into sediments beneath the injection site. 12 Pressure could interact with other users of the subsurface, within several tens of kilometres. If two injection sites overlap, the excess pressures will be additive, so that cooperation is needed to avoid inadvertent fracture of adjacent top seal to storage -so damaging the viability of that property. Equally possible is that CO 2 injection could overlap with hydrocarbon extraction -in which case the effects may be broadly neutral, but detailed planning of pressure management at the hydrocarbon site could be affected. In hydrocarbon exploitation by extraction, there is not normally any concept of pressure trespass or damage to adjacent assets or users. Although there is no known engineering problem, it remains to be seen if pressure trespass will be established as a legally serious problem for CCS.
VI. CO 2 INJECTION
A. Types of Trapping
It is conceptually well understood that several types of trapping are possible. During the injection and site operation phase, physical retention of fl uid CO 2 is required. When this CO 2 moves through the whole space of the reservoir, residual saturation trapping becomes important, forming small bubbles of CO 2 isolated in different pores. This can be an important effect in timescales of only years to decades, and may retain up to 30 per cent of the injected CO 2 . During timescales of several decades to a few thousand years, dissolution of injected CO 2 into the subsurface brine or hydrocarbon becomes important; this will usually result in a fl uid more dense than the original brine, so that dissolved CO 2 will sink within the sedimentary basin to produce secure storage, rather than rise to form a potential leak. Natural accumulations and engineering simulations both show that this type of secure storage can be promoted by designing CO 2 injection to encounter the maximum volume of pore water. Reaction of dissolved CO 2 with surrounding rock can sometimes produce new minerals; such reactions can occur rapidly in new or fractured minerals, or in high-fl ux situations close to boreholes. However, in the majority of the rock and CO 2 volume, these reactions in natural situations are extremely slow (tens of thousands to millions of years) and absorb only a few percentage points of injected CO 2 . It seems probable that the greatest risks of CO 2 escape from the primary reservoir occur during the physical retention period, ie including the period of site operation. This is at a time when monitoring can be most intense.
B. Geometries of CO 2 Trap
Although the consideration of each storage site will be different in detail, there are fundamentally only two types. The fi rst, structure traps, provide a geometric shape that retains buoyant CO 2 . The easiest of these concepts is that of a dome, which can be described as an anticline, or fold, with down-dips in all four compass directions. The above-ground analogy would be an isolated smooth sloped hill. Here, CO 2 will be retained within the dome topography, provided that the primary seal is not fractured. Similar containment can be achieved with a range of geological structures including fault blocks, unconformities or 2-D anticline folds. Such geographically confi ned storage sites enable monitoring to be clearly focused, and there is no direct interaction between injected CO 2 and other subsurface users. The second type is a layer of reservoir rock, which lies at an angle (dip) to the horizontal. In these cases, retention of CO 2 requires an overlying primary seal, together with a combination of residual saturation trapping, dissolution, or very large pore volume.
C. Effects of CO 2 Injection
Injection of CO 2 will produce several effects in saline formations. Three such effects are highlighted here. First, injected CO 2 is a fl uid of extremely low viscosity and so can migrate rapidly through porous reservoirs. Experience at the Utsira injection site, combined with numerous computational reservoir models, clearly shows that a thin 5 -10m zone of fl uid CO 2 can migrate at 1m/day laterally along the top of a saline formation, beneath the seal. Thus the small amount of CO 2 in that leading edge of the plume may be important for concepts of trespass, even though it is volumetrically insignifi cant. The second effect is that a great volume of CO 2 remains in the injected plume. This type of trapping is likely to be more diffi cult to monitor and fully quantify, if there is a requirement that all the CO 2 must be closely tracked. A third effect of storage in aquifers also provides situations where pressure waves or CO 2 from one operator may move in the subsurface to become mingled with pressure waves or CO 2 from a second operator. If the CO 2 from different operators needs to be distinguished into the future, it will be necessary to fi ngerprint individual operators ' CO 2 using parts per billion of suitable labelling gases or compounds.
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D. Consequences of CO 2 Injection
Several aspects of CO 2 injection may produce unhelpful effects. The most debated of these is the far-fi eld pressure wave, or transient ' pulse ' . When CO 2 is rapidly injected as additional fl uid into a sealed, or more normally only partially sealed, saline formation, an increase of pressure can be anticipated. To avoid artifi cially induced fracturing of the geological seal overlying the primary reservoir, the limits of additional pressure increase can be calculated and closely audited during the injection time period. The pressure pulse will affect an area many times that of the liquid CO 2 . This can affect multiple operators within one saline formation; the pressure pulses will interact such that injection into neighbouring structures A and B can increase the background pressure of a new storage site development, structure C, before any CO 2 has been injected, and so reduce the storage capacity of structure C. Licensing may have to treat sites as connected groups. Reservoir engineering simulations show that a pressure pulse decreases to background within a few decades of injection ceasing. In confi ned formations, or geo-pressured deep settings, this pressure increase will defi ne the limits of possible CO 2 injection. In the more normal circumstance of partially open and partially connected saline formations, CO 2 injection will depend on the rate of pressure dissipation. If safe pressure limits were exceeded during injection, and fracturing of the overlying seals became a problem, it would be possible simply to stop injecting, or to extract a few per cent of the injected CO 2 to decrease pressure.
A second consequence of CO 2 injection is the potential in the far-fi eld to induce movement of brine from the deep saline formation. If such fl uids, containing very salty and metal-rich water, do reach extraction zones for drinking water for agricultural wells, problems of water pollution could, in theory, occur. However, calculations using the volume of injected CO 2 for a 25-year storage lease, compared to the whole porosity volume available within the rock, show that groundwater tables will shift, on average, only a few tens of millimetres vertically.
E. Incomplete Containment
It is well understood that CO 2 could escape from the site of its injection, by several methods. These are all capable of being predicted during the site choice and evaluation stages. As discussed in section IV, because of the variation in, and precise nature of, natural subsurface systems, it is impossible to guarantee 100 per cent containment into the indefi nite future. There are multiple possibilities for smallscale leakage through the primary seal. This is why monitoring of the storage site needs to be undertaken, and why the highest quality of baseline survey is essential, because all future work will be referenced onto that baseline. The method of monitoring will depend on the exact site. Conventional oil industry methods have been, and will be, adapted. Regulations need to accommodate these possibilities. It is not yet possible to place established probability values on all of these features, because engineered CO 2 storage has never been undertaken in these diverse settings for any period of time. It will be necessary to gain learning about the quantifi cation of unplanned migration by means of experimentation at a number of validation storage sites. Defi ned structures offer the greatest certainty of CO 2 location. Regionally extensive saline formations are likely to involve laterally extensive CO 2 migration and could result in the movement of CO 2 outside a geographically constrained licence area, even though that is unlikely to constitute a leak returning to the surface. Where pore space is not owned by the federal state (such as in the US) then this could produce situations of trespass into different property. Any of these idealised situations could result in CO 2 ' s occurring in hard-to-predict or unexpected locations above the primary seal, or in slow diffuse leakage if the primary seal has not been adequately assessed or is damaged during injection.
F. Role of Demonstrations and Evolving Regulation
Projects to demonstrate CCS are usually discussed in the context of their capture and power-plant technology. However, an equally important point is that demonstrations of subsurface storage capability still need to be undertaken. A diverse suite of subsurface environments exists within any individual sedimentary basin, and also worldwide. Commercial-sized demonstrations (greater than 1 Mt CO 2 per year) have the opportunity to test the validity of different types. Only after such demonstrations have been undertaken are problems discovered and solved; once this occurs, more precise and prescriptive legislative guidance can be given. Legislators should beware of over-prescription before enough validation projects are undertaken globally. These injection projects, at industrial scale, will provide effective in situ average measures of real-world migration speeds of the CO 2 plume, of dissolution, and pressure pulse increase and decay, to compare with and refi ne the theoretical predictions made beforehand. There is potential to gain strong benefi t from sharing of results because, with the learnings being gained at the controlling microscopic scale, petrophysical properties of rocks are considered portable from one setting to another. A sandstone in Texas can behave identically to a sandstone beneath the UK North Sea.
G. Operational Interventions
Great efforts are made by many regulators to install monitoring equipment and secure operational standards at CO 2 injection sites. However equally, or more, important are the abilities to use the knowledge and undertake actions to ensure secure storage if operations do not perform as planned. Two examples of commercialscale CO 2 storage can demonstrate this.
i. In Salah, Algeria, Onshore
In Salah is the location of the Krechba gasfi eld, in a deep subsurface closed anticline fold in Carboniferous sandstones as part of the gasfi eld complex of the central Algeria desert. The natural gas methane produced is high in CO 2 (10 per cent mole volume), and so needs to be separated before sale and pipeline transport northwards to the coast. A consortium of Sonatrach, Statoil and BP decided to use this separated pure CO 2 for re-injection, to test the ability to create local storage globally at CO 2 gas production sites. The legal and regulatory institutional oversight of CO 2 storage in Algeria is believed to be effective but minimal. The injection reservoir was pragmatically chosen to be the deeper, down-dip, extension of the gasfi eld reservoir. That is water-fi lled at about 1,800m. This would be geologically well understood, and shared the same thick and impermeable mudrock seal that had clearly retained methane plus CO 2 in the main reservoir. A potable aquifer is regionally widespread within 400m of the surface, and needs protecting. It was always clearly known that this reservoir falls far outside the factors recommended for ' best practice ' CO 2 storage, with a low permeability of 10mDarcy, being thin (just 20m), and the entire site having a geological history showing many kilometres of uplift from deep burial to its present depth. Subsurface geological mapping shows many NW -SE fault trends (some of which are reversed in movement due to uplift), apparently linking up from the deep non-reservoir basement into the shallower reservoir. However, if this type of poor site adjacent to gas production could be developed and operated with secure performance, that would open the possibility of similar developments with minimal infrastructure at numerous gas fi elds with high CO 2 content. The site was used as a test bed for extensive and detailed monitoring with all plausible science techniques and technology instruments. Injection of 0.74 Mt CO 2 /yr commenced in early 2004, with the intention to store 17 -20Mt CO 2 through a 30-year production project. Several comprehensive assessments of risks were undertaken 13 before development, and a design limit was set for the upper limit of injection pressure to be 24 -29 MPa (3,500 to 4,200 psi). Risk of CO 2 leakage upwards through re-activated and reopened fractures was considered improbable but of high impact. Consequently, the boundary of the subsurface CO 2 licence was set shallow and above the most likely seal. Pre-existing boreholes, fractures and faults were recognised as the most likely CO 2 leakage routes.
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After three years of injection, surface surveying detected a minor leak of CO 2 gas from the wellhead of KB-5, a disused borehole. The CO 2 was unexpected, due to faster than anticipated migration along faults and factures. This well had been recognised as poorly cemented after abandonment, by pre-emptive surveys before CO 2 injection had started. This was managed by re-sealing the well to a better standard.
By October 2008 a surface uplift of a 5 -10mm/yr became detectable above some parts of the injection site around well KB-502. This used low-cost satellite surveys from InSAR -radar frequency interferometry, now available at low cost for several surveys per year. At the same time, modelling calculations indicated that injection pressures had exceeded those intended. Thus a possibility emerged that CO 2 had migrated vertically up though re-opened fractures associated with geologically old and geologically ancient basement fault zones. Carbon dioxide injection rates were reduced, to reduce the pressure effects. Further simulation of injection and of rock mechanics 14 demonstrated that the clusters of fractures re-opened by the excess pressures could be 3,500m long, 50m wide and extend 350m upwards from the reservoir. Surface displacement was due to pressurised CO 2 migrating from the reservoir into clusters of fractures within the caprock but not breaking through the caprock.
The continued growth of the opened fracture created a risk. Leakage of CO 2 up to the potable aquifer and land surface could have been possible. That risk had already been identifi ed by intensive multi-technique monitoring. That had been managed by a reduced rate of CO 2 injection, and eventually to cessation of injection in 2008. In Salah is a good example of the stringently self-regulated operation of a CO 2 storage site. A full risk appraisal had been undertaken before borehole drilling, and intensive monitoring was deployed using remote sensing at low cost. That was able to detect unpredicted behaviour and link to pre-arranged programmes of action -and to provide support where necessary. Tough regulation is good, but must also be adequately enforced -by an informed regulator and /or by self-imposed fear of practical and reputational damage.
ii. Sn ø hvit, Norway, Offshore
Sn ø hvit is the northernmost gasfi eld in Europe, exporting LNG from the Barents Sea continental shelf of Norway. The fi eld is operated by Statoil, who have decided to clean the natural CO 2 mix 5 -8 per cent from the commercial hydrocarbon gases and to store geologically store CO 2 in the deep subsurface to prevent climate change emissions. The commercial logic is driven by the same offshore tax penalty of 500 NOK/ton that encouraged gas clean-up and CCS at Sleipner, and CCS was a condition imposed by the Norwegian Parliament when consenting the project. Carbon dioxide is produced offshore, brought onshore to separate from LNG, and the CO 2 is returned offshore through a dedicated pipe and 0.7Mt/yr CO 2 are reinjected to the deep subsurface. The onshore LNG plant emits about 900,000t CO 2 /yr -about 2 per cent of Norwegian GHG -but is covered under different legislation for onshore emissions with no tax penalty. This produces 4.3 Mtonnes LNG/yr, equivalent to 38 million barrels of oil. Injection of 99 per cent pure CO 2 started in April 2008, initially using the 2,560m subsealevel Tub å en Formation, deeper than the gas reservoir. The detailed formal legal defi nition of the storage site is not publicly available. But Statoil, as operator, certainly made several suites of different assessments and predictions for several subsurface localities. Detailed monitoring of downhole fl uid pressure and seismic refl ection surveys showed that the site was not performing as well as anticipated, so that CO 2 was not spreading evenly through the storage reservoir but was instead restricted to one small reservoir compartment. That CO 2 was imaged on seismic refl ection, and the excess pressure was continually monitored, so that when pressure increase approached close to rock fracture pressure, all injection was stopped before any adverse blowout. During initial evaluation of the site by Statoil, a Plan B was already defi ned. A new borehole was drilled during 2011 into the shallower St ø Formation, which is not geologically segmented by faults and is a down-dip extension of the producing reservoir. This has performed well, in line with predictions of CO 2 injection. During autumn 2016, a second injection borehole was planned and drilled into a different part of the St ø Formation, which now enables options to be chosen for the rate of injection into each hole.
The lessons from Sn ø hvit are as follows:
(1) Carbon dioxide storage development can occur without being supervised by specifi c EU legislation on CCS. (2) A competent operator is vital during these initial learnings on how to choose and develop storage sites. An operator who is experienced in the deep subsurface problems that can arise adds greatly to the resilience of operation and the remedial choices rapidly available in controlling and modifying the injection at the storage site. (3) An experienced and competent operator of hydrocarbon fi elds will inevitably make several plans. In case of events becoming unexpected, a substitute (and well-costed and already evaluated) borehole plan exists, which can be enacted very rapidly.
H. Accidents
An understandable fear with any industrial technology, particularly a newly developing large-scale technology, is that of catastrophic accident. Several false analogies are often made to illustrate CO 2 storage in the subsurface. One of the most common of these is the Lake Nyos incident in Cameroon. Here, a volcanic lake trapped free gaseous CO 2 beneath a deep column of water. When this was disturbed by submarine rockfall, the gas bubble erupted rapidly through the water column to spread onto the surrounding land, and killed 1,600 people. This analogy is incorrectly applied to subsurface CO 2 storage. In the subsurface case, CO 2 cannot rise through intact porous rock, or even through fracture networks, at such a rapid rate.
There are many studies of natural CO 2 seeps worldwide, and none has shown this extreme rate of CO 2 leakage. Where historical records exist, it appears that the risk of death to the affected population from natural CO 2 seeps is about 10,000 times less than the probability of death in a car accident. 15 A different type of fear is that of a borehole failure. Blowouts, due to excess subsurface pressure, are not known frequently in CO 2 boreholes. One such incident at Sheep Mountain, a natural CO 2 accumulation, was closed down using standard oil and gas remediation techniques, within weeks. Unanticipated incidents do, of course, occur in the offshore. A spectacular example was the BP-operated failure in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Although this demonstrably leaked large amounts of oil into the ocean, it is also remarkable how rapidly new and untested technology was built, experimented with, and eventually successfully deployed -within a timescale of only weeks. Although this leak was a poorly-handled public relations disaster, a case can be made that it was a commendable technical recovery. This gives confidence that even unexpected and new incidents can be mitigated rapidly, without the entire oilfi eld (or CO 2 storage site) becoming emptied. As alluded to in section V.B.i, there are now several pieces of work to show that leakage of CO 2 injected under planned and designed pressure constraints cannot be as extreme as hydrocarbon blow-outs; and the total CO 2 in a catastrophic leak can be only a very few per cent of the CO 2 injected.
An example of onshore leakage of CO 2 by spectacular blowout from an onshore borehole occurred in Serbia. This is worthy of note because it shows that mitigation and control can be achieved at low cost with basic equipment. 16 The overpressured Becej CO 2 fi eld experienced a blowout at the end of 1968, killing several people. Uncontrolled gas fl ow lasted for six months, until the deep borehole collapsed to reduce the fl ow for an additional month, which created a crater at the surface that also collapsed to block the remaining fl ow, except for a few bubbles that rose continually to the surface. A total loss of 17 Bm3 is calculated. In mid-2007 an artifi cial borehole seal was applied using a mix of silica gel and urea, emplaced through a specially drilled diagonal relief well intersecting the blowout. That forms a solid cross-linked polymer capable of retaining geopressure. Leakage is reported to have been reduced to a tiny yearly quantity.
Borehole problems of a different kind were remediated in Mississippi during CO 2 injection for CO 2 -Enhanced Oil Recovery (CO 2 -EOR -see section VII). An abandoned borehole had not been adequately sealed, and although not used for CO 2 injection, was excessively pressured during CO 2 injection and fl owed CO 2 plus oil and drilling mud from 650m to the land surface for 37 days from 9 August 2011. Surface effects included deaths of several animals due to the settling of dense CO 2 in hollows, but there is no recorded harm to humans. The borehole crossed two exploited aquifers in the subsurface, but no contamination was recorded in either. As to this author ' s speculation on the cause: the depth of leakage is around the transition from CO 2 fl uid to CO 2 gas, so it is possible that a phase transition and very large-volume expansion created the pressure drive for leak-off. The operating company was fi ned $ 650,000, and halted the leak by drilling a new well to cement the inadequately abandoned well. Reports state that serious local surface effects required removal of 32,000 bbl of liquids from the site, plus 27,000 tons of contaminated soil plus drilling mud. Subsequently, 28 abandoned legacy wells in the oilfi eld, dating from the 1940s and 1950s, were pre-emptively remediated to modern standards. Two additional blowouts through Mississippi legacy wells occurred in 2007, 17 Oil and Gas Journal , ' 2014 Worldwide EOR Survey ' , at www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-112/ issue-4/special-report-eor-heavy-oil-survey/2014-worldwide-eor-survey.html . and CO 2 bubbled slowly to the surface in a Louisiana incident in 2013, which was remediated by injecting chemical treatment downhole.
The two examples above indicate the diffi culties of pressure management, and the diffi culties of guaranteeing the security of 100 per cent of tens of thousands of legacy boreholes during onshore operations. Arguably the local damage caused, although signifi cant, is still less than the dispersed damage caused to global climate by not injecting CO 2 . And it should also be noted that all these occurrences were in onshore CO 2 -EOR operations, where standards are much lower than operations offshore, and where standards of design are much lower than for boreholes or sites specifically planned for CO 2 injection and retention. Are these few incidents a ' price worth paying ' for the wider environmental benefi ts of accelerating and enabling CO 2 injection ? That has not been legally tested. The issue, though, is of permissive local state legislation, focused on enabling oil production rather than enforcing CO 2 retention.
VII. ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY
In addition to the ' aquifer injection ' style of CO 2 injection analysed in section VI, there is the possibility to engage in very large-tonnage utilisation of CO 2 . This is by injecting fl uid-phase CO 2 into operating, or partly depleted, oilfi elds, which, in the correctly chosen geological circumstances, has the effect of producing additional oil that would otherwise be left permanently in the ground. This is known as CO 2 -EOR, and has been an established and profi table business practice in the USA since 1972. Careful distinction should be made from other technological types of EOR -such as polymers, solvents, steam, brightwater -which do not use or store CO 2 . A closely similar technique is the injection of methane CH4, to reduce oil viscosity. More than 100 such projects are operating CO 2 injection at any one time 17 in USA, Canada, Brazil, Trinidad and Turkey. These projects are motivated not by storage of CO 2 for climate mitigation, but by the commercial magnet of producing an additional 5 -20 per cent of the original oil in place from established fi elds.
Typically in the USA, a CO 2 -EOR project will purchase CO 2 from a natural source, or increasingly a CCS-engineered project, transport the CO 2 by pipe, inject it into many tens of boreholes on an onshore fi eld, produce additional oil, and separate and re-inject the CO 2 to produce yet more oil (to save costs of purchasing additional CO 2 ). The CO 2 used remains below ground and is not vented to air -although some of the CO 2 could be recovered and used for EOR in a different oilfi eld.
In the US, rules provide tax incentives to develop CO 2 -EOR, from the perspective of enabling extra domestic oil production to aid national security of fuel supply. Thus CO 2 -EOR is an excellent way of making CCS projects much more commercially profi table, typically reducing the wholesale price of electrical power from a CCS plant by $ 20 -40/MWhr, about 30 per cent. Thus CO 2 -EOR can be seen as a proven method of commercialising CCS.
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18 J Stewart and RS Haszeldine , ' Can producing oil store more carbon ? ' ( 2015 ) A weakness in that argument is the carbon accounting balance of CO 2 injected and stored, versus the extra carbon costs of engineering operations plus the extraction refi ning and combustion of additional produced oil. In the US, carbon from extra produced oil is often not considered as an emission, as equivalent amounts of oil would be conventionally produced, eventually, from some other State and used in combustion. However, in terms of carbon accounting for the environmental benefi t, it is important to add the carbon emission from extra oil, as the CO 2 supplied for EOR has already been derived by capture from combusting hydrocarbon.
There cannot be a double benefi t from the same CO 2 , but there can be a benefi t if CO 2 is derived from CCS fi tted onto a fi rst combustion site, that CO 2 is stored for CO 2 -EOR and remains stored within the reservoir, and the oil is combusted and CCS is fi tted to that. That requires knowledge and regulation along the whole CCS chain. Alternatively, we suggest that a more portable accounting method can be hypothesised, which is locally based. First, CO 2 is injected and oil produced, but because stored CO 2 has a value for climate purposes, there is an incentive to store more, rather than economise on purchase of the amount stored. Thus the maximum tonnage of CO 2 is incentivised to be used in a project, not the minimum. Secondly, after the production of additional oil has ceased, the licence or permit stipulates that injection of CO 2 must continue for a specifi ed tonnage, for example for another 10 or 20 years of operation. This stores CO 2 in an established site, with good monitoring, and cumulatively tips the carbon accounting balance to net negative. 18 The pipelines delivering CO 2 are paid for by oil profi ts and are built to last 60 years; the ancillary engineering equipment, boreholes and CO 2 capture technologies are all established more frequently than in a non-profi t state-funded case of CCS development. So more CCS equipment is built, learnings and cost reduction are gained, and more CO 2 is stored sooner. 19 In legal attribution, it may be necessary to determine how securely stored the CO 2 is. That can be monitored by measurement of the geochemistry of pore waters in the oilfi eld. 20 This shows that CO 2 in EOR dissolves rapidly with the pore water it is forced to contact, and so CO 2 is dissolved, or is in residual saturation, and is about 40 times more securely stored than in aquifer injection. And ownership of CO 2 can be fi ngerprinted by minute traces of noble gases that are intimately mixed in with CO 2 from different origins, but in different ratios which allow diagnostic fi ngerprinting. There could of course be problems of ownership, CO 2 attribution and liability during the lifetime of one asset. During the initial oil production, company A owns the oil but produces only part, and leaves residual saturation of unproduceable oil in much of the fi eld pore space. The fi eld is sold to company B, who injects
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CO 2 and produces more oil: is tax payable differently on the continued production of oil contrasted with tax payable on additional oil produced ? And who owns the residual oil abandoned by Company A ? After oil production ceases, the fi eld is sold to company C, who operates this as a storage site by injecting CO 2 through established infrastructure. Does Company C have liability for CO 2 injected by Company B ? And if a borehole not used for CO 2 operations leaks CO 2 , is company A liable for its incorrect sealing ?
VIII. STORAGE LIABILITY Who retains the future liability for stored CO 2, and especially for CO 2 that may migrate in directions originally unpredicted ? This is a scary question for producers, project developers who may import CO 2 , storage operators, regulators and governments. Different jurisdictions are assembling different approaches -from the very conservative actuarial approaches of the EU, to the pragmatic experience-based cooperative of Alberta, to the mutually negotiated licences of Western Australia and the not publicly stated experience of Norway. These all have very different impact on the valuation of risk and the fi nancing of a project to cover the ' what if ' .
A. Member State as Insurer for Validation Projects
A cautious regulatory and licensing approach can easily become too negative, and act as a blockage to projects being developed, by placing too high a liability burden on initial project proposers. Two approaches can help to mitigate this problem.
First the fi nancial method, by which risk can be shared. This can be a method adapted from the 1957 Price-Anderson Act approach to US nuclear power, where the site operator is liable for the fi rst parts of a problem, but ultimately a Member State government can also provide enabling support by becoming the formal underwriter of last resort, which is inevitably its position in any case. It should be possible to construct a ' staged liability ' to cover CO 2 storage, by means of defi ned partnership between operators, insurance companies and governments. For example, an operator could hold the fi rst £ 100 million of liability (which could remediate 50 boreholes onshore, or three remedial boreholes offshore), with an insurance company holding the next £ 500 million of liability (which would cover installation of a large new offshore platform or pipeline) and the Member State government holding liability beyond that; the exception being negligence or deliberate malpractice, in which case full liability would remain with the operating company.
Second is to improve scientifi c understanding of the potential problem. In effect to ask ' How much CO 2 could leak ? ' This requires a greater knowledge of the national sub-surface -an activity that may well be based on compilation of previously existing industry information, but which has to be led and funded by the state. This knowledge is important in the context of uncertainty concerning long duration slow leakage. Does indefi nite liability remain held by the site developer -very diffi cult to hold in conventional year-end actuarial compilations -or does the state take over 21 Lakatos et al, n 16 above. See also section VI.H. 22 A total loss of 17Bn m3 is stated, and converting that at surface density equates to 33 M tonnesaround 1 Mt/yr. During the fi rst months of unrestricted blowout, the loss of CO 2 is estimated to have been 0.5 B m3, ie just 0.9 Mt CO 2 . This blowout and CO 2 loss was driven by the extreme natural overpressure of the CO 2 accumulation, stated to be an original 151 bar pressure at 900m depth, ie an excess pressure of 91 bars, during blowout over three years this lost 34 bars of pressure drive.
23 See further on the CCS Directive ch 2 by Velcova in this volume. 24 See sections VI.G.i and ii.
liability at some point after CO 2 injection has ceased and routine monitoring shows the CO 2 plume to be behaving within the range of predictions for adequate site performance ? The state (and indeed the developer) can be greatly aided by some additional confi dence in how much (or indeed how little) CO 2 could leak. As described in section V, the leakable amount is small, and is greatest at the point in time where injection ceases, but that is also the point in time when maximum resources are available to reduce or fi x any problems.
B. Site Specifi c Monitoring is Required but Total Leakage is Small
The most extreme CO 2 example may be the Becej blowout in Serbia. 21 Here, a total loss of control of the well resulted in unrestricted fl ow to the surface from the highly overpressured CO 2 accumulation over 209 days, followed by slower seepage for a further 39 years until the leak was sealed. 22 Comparing this natural system at extreme overpressure, to intended excess injection pressure engineered during CO 2 storage of just 5 -10 bars, shows that engineered storage has minimal risk of blowout or leakage -a risk of leakage of maybe 1 Mt CO 2 /yr, about the same as the injection rate of CO 2 into one borehole. Chronic, slow leakage or migration outside the licensed storage complex has also been discussed in the preceding sections. How important is this ? As an analogy, consider oil trapping and migration in the North Sea hydrocarbon basins. In the North Sea there are about 300 commercial-sized oilfi elds, charged with oil and gas from about 90 million years ago. Mass balance calculations suggest that about 90 per cent of all the oil ever generated in the North Sea is unaccounted for. Even at the worst case, assuming that all this oil leaked from oilfi elds (rather than still being distributed today by residual trapping in sub-economic accumulations), it would still produce a maximum leakage of 1 per cent per million years from all oilfi elds. That is about one million times more optimistic than the leakage rates implied and expected to be insured for under the EU CCS Directive legislation. 23 Directly considering CO 2 in the deep subsurface, it is diffi cult to measure directly, but it is clearly possible to measure leakage incidents in the deep subsurface. As with the examples of Sn ø vhit or In Salah, 24 existing monitoring technology derived from hydrocarbon geoscience can be modifi ed so that the incident can be adequately detected and remedial action taken, a long time before there is any material or climate impact. Some 20 -60 per cent of injected CO 2 will be retained in the reservoir by residual saturation, at least a further 40 per cent will dissolve in groundwater contacted by migrating CO 2 -longer migration means more dissolution -and additional residual saturation (dynamic or migration-assisted trapping) will also occur along the migration path. And even if CO 2 reaches the soil horizons or seabed sediments, at least 60 per cent of that small amount can be trapped within tens of metres of the ground or seabed surface. Migration to the surface is only feasible at large scale along fault zones 25 or broken boreholes (see above), and is sealed where the overburden sediments are overpressured.
It seems very probable that, for legal or actuarial assessment of liability, even for storage sites of many tens or hundreds of million tonnes of CO 2 , the total liability from catastrophic or chronic leakage is very low. Consequently it is immense over-regulation to require that the full fi nancial value of all CO 2 injected has to be insured, or held as a bond, in case of leakage. Rigorous site choice and appropriate operations and monitoring should greatly reduce these risks.
C. How to Progress ?
An industry, or state activity, to store CO 2 securely does not develop automatically. There are hurdles comprising geological knowledge, regulation, licensing and control institutions, and either state mandates and funding or creation of a viable business model. An individual capture to storage project could be proposed, agreed and built to operate within three to fi ve years. But to establish a durable and formal framework is a lot more complex, and global experience shows that this process can easily take 10 years. The fundamental basis is geological knowledge, which is particular to the individual country. Unless that is compiled and convincingly demonstrated, there can be no serious political leadership or commercial interest. Evaluation of storage is the essential fi rst step.
Although the engineering principles and processes of CO 2 storage are well understood globally, it is understandably the case that policy advisers in individual countries may prefer to start domestic CO 2 storage with a short-duration or smaller-size project to ' validate ' the activity. The purpose of validation projects is to explore designs, concepts and operations that are well-enough studied to provide confi dence in experts and informed decision makers. At this stage of a project, onerous or cooperative legality and regulation can help or hinder. Although applying the fullest secure legal fi xtures onto CO 2 storage may appear administratively desirable, it is important to recognise that too much regulation at the start can discourage investors and developers. In the Norwegian example, existing hydrocarbon knowledge and legislation was adapted within two years of 1994 to enable the fi rst CO 2 injection for storage and transfer decades of knowledge and experience from that sector. In the EU CCS Directive example, a legislative approach has been viewed as rigorous to harsh, and as remotely designed by adminstrators. projects have developed. In the Alberta example, hydrocarbon and acid gas disposal legislation has been adapted, together with risk mitigation by a pooling of longtimescale leakage risk (operated by the Government). Storage projects are now operating. In the Western Australia example, co-design between the developer and the provincial state has created mutually acceptable and operational solutions. Treating the fi rst validation projects in a fl exible way, with some method to share risk and act as guarantor, should allow the fi rst projects to proceed. Results from fi rst projects will rapidly improve certainty, and will enable price structures and risk allocation systems to evolve, which enables subsequent routine projects to become insurable and more appropriately legislated and controlled.
IX. PROGRESS AND OUTLOOK FOR CCS AND PARIS 2015
Has the theoretical concept and practical engineering of CO 2 storage proceeded rapidly ? The concept of CCS on an industrial scale, as a way of reducing CO 2 emissions, can be traced to 1977 and Cesare Marchetti, 26 who suggested CO 2 storage in depleted gas-or oilfi elds, or deep ocean currents. The UK potential to store large tonnages of CO 2 in geological pore space was proposed in 1991 by BGS 27 followed by the fi rst storage appraisal. 28 No commercial projects have resulted. By contrast in Norway, the 1994 Bruntland Report, Limits to Growth , had particular resonance, as Norway had become an affl uent nation based on oil production, coupled with environmental concern. A concern to reduce emissions of CO 2 from offshore industrial hydrocarbon activities in 1994 resulted in the Norwegian Parliament placing a tax on offshore emissions at around $ 50/tonne CO 2 . That had an immediate effect, prompting Statoil to develop offshore of Norway the world ' s fi rst application of CCS for climate protection. That has operated successfully from 1996. Carbon dioxide from produced hydrocarbons at the Sleipner fi eld has to be separated for commercial sale purity. The extra tax incentivises CO 2 to be injected into the nearest available geological aquifer sandstone, 1 km beneath the seabed, and has continued without incident for 20 years. No environmental rules or regulations or permits specifi c for CO 2 were applied. Norway has the only two offshore CO 2 storage projects operating today (2017) in a commercial environment. A clear inference from these two histories, similar in geology on opposite sides of the North Sea, is that multidecade government commitment with clear and closely focused taxation, linked to more substantial environmental regulation for carbon emissions reduction, results in much more effective policy instruments than expecting markets to innovate, or nudging with ephemeral individual politicians heading up environmental or climate departments of government.
